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Abstract
The adoption of the SustainableDevelopmentGoals (SDGs) and the new international climate treaty
could put 2015 into the history books as a deﬁning year for setting human development on amore
sustainable pathway. The global climate policy and SDGagendas are highly interconnected: theway
that the climate problem is addressed strongly affects the prospects ofmeeting numerous other SDGs
and vice versa. Drawing on existing scenario results from a recent energy-economy-climatemodel
inter-comparison project, this letter analyses these synergies and (risk) trade-offs of alternative 2 °C
pathways across indicators relevant for energy-related SDGs and sustainable energy objectives.We
ﬁnd that limiting the availability of keymitigation technologies yields some co-beneﬁts and decreases
risks speciﬁc to these technologies but greatly increasesmany others. Fewer synergies and substantial
trade-offs across SDGs are locked into the system forweak short-term climate policies that are broadly
in linewith current IntendedNationallyDeterminedContributions (INDCs), particularly when
combinedwith constraints on technologies. Lowering energy demand growth is key tomanaging
these trade-offs and creating synergies acrossmultiple energy-related SDdimensions.We argue that
SD considerations are central for choosing socially acceptable 2 °Cpathways: the prospects ofmeeting
other SDGs need not dwindle and can even be enhanced for some goals if appropriate climate policy
choices aremade. Progress on the climate policy and SDGagendas should therefore be trackedwithin
a uniﬁed framework.
1. Introduction
There is hope that 2015 will be remembered as a
deﬁning year for setting human development on a
more sustainable pathway. Two important milestones
were reached. On 25 September, a new development
agenda was adopted in New York aimed at eradicating
poverty and facilitating inclusive development within
ever tighter planetary boundaries. Economic, social
and environmental progress will be tracked across a set
of agreed sustainable development goals (SDGs). The
SDG framework is intended to manage trade-offs and
maximize synergies across the 17 different goals and
associated 169 targets (Griggs et al 2013).
On 12 December, countries agreed upon a new
international climate treaty, the Paris Agreement, at
the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties
(COP21) in Paris. It ‘aims to strengthen the global
response to the threat of climate change, in the context
of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate
poverty, including by holding the increase in the global
average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-
industrial levels’ (UNFCCC2015a).
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Both processes are highly interrelated: SD is an
explicit part of the Paris Agreement, while avoiding
dangerous climate change features as one of the SDGs
(#13). In fact, failure in one process would undermine
the success of the other. Stringent and sustained miti-
gation is a necessary condition for SD, because una-
bated climate change will exacerbate many of today’s
development issues and negate future improvements
(see Fleurbaey et al 2014). However, it is an insufﬁcient
condition for SD, because some 2 °C pathways could,
if not designed properly, undermine SD in non-cli-
mate dimensions. For example, pathways with a lim-
ited short-term ambition like the current INDCs may
have higher SD risks than more ambitious ones. Such
broader SD implications could delegitimize some 2 °C
pathways or even the 2 °C target itself (Edenhofer and
Kowarsch 2015). SD further hinges on the successful
implementation of non-climate policies that comple-
ment or support climate policies in other dimensions.
Thus, identifying socially acceptable 2 °C pathways
requires framing climate policy in a broader SD
context.
Assessments of alternative mitigation pathways so
far have mainly focused on characterizing the under-
lying technological and economic challenges (Clarke
et al 2014), but less is known about the wider social,
economic and environmental implications. For exam-
ple, many 2 °C pathways project large amounts of
bioenergy demand in the second half of this century. It
is highly debated in the literature whether these can be
provided sustainably: food security, place-speciﬁc
livelihoods, water availability and biodiversity are
amongst the critical issues being discussed (Creutzig
et al 2012, Smith et al 2014). At the same time, many
2 °C pathways project potential health gains and co-
beneﬁts for other sustainability objectives. The bal-
ance of these co-effects is poorly understood, particu-
larly on the supply side, because risks of alternative
2 °C pathways for non-climate sustainability objec-
tives have not yet been systematically analyzed (von
Stechow et al 2015).
In this letter, we analyze the implications of alter-
native 2 °C pathways for SD risk dimensions by draw-
ing on existing, publicly available inter-model
comparison results from integrated energy-economy-
climate models—henceforth referred to as integrated
models (see SI section 1, available at stacks.iop.org/
ERL/11/034022/mmedia). We demonstrate how
broadening the analytical framework can allow both
for a more informed public debate about alternative
2 °C pathways and how achieving the climate SDG
may affect the prospects of meeting other energy-rela-
ted SDGs. This is important both for critically discuss-
ing the relationship between the international climate
policy and SDG agendas as well as for identifying strin-
gentmitigation pathways that are socially acceptable.
2.Methods
Choosing appropriate climate policies is an exercise in
riskmanagement for which it is key to understand and
evaluate relevant uncertainties (Kunreuther
et al 2013). We focus on uncertainties related to
different model structures and assumptions, i.e.
‘model uncertainty’ (Drouet et al 2015) and draw on
results from a structured inter-comparison exercise of
integrated energy-economy-climate models,
AMPERE (Kriegler et al 2015, Riahi et al 2015). To
complement existing literature, this data is used to
assess relevant SD implications of alternative clusters
of mitigation pathways that are consistent with the
2 °C target (see table S2) to initiate a public debate on
their wider sustainability implications.
2.1. Choice of indicators for SD risks
The analysis builds on recent literature that explores a
growing number of mitigation challenges with impli-
cations for non-climate sustainability objectives.
Comprehensive discussions can be found in Clarke
et al (2014, section 6.6) and von Stechow et al (2015,
section 4). Table 1 summarizes the indicators that can
be calculated from integrated model variables. Our
choice of indicators is further constrained by the
model structures, scenario runs, and reported vari-
ables as aggregated in the publicly available AMPERE
database (https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/
AMPEREDB). For example, the coarse regional dis-
aggregation of reported data in AMPERE impedes the
analysis of indicators that are most relevant for
inequality and poverty outcomes, such as energy
supply per capita to satiate basic human needs (see
Steckel et al 2013, Lamb and Rao 2015 and SI section 2
for a discussion of further model limitations). By
systematically linking the chosen set of indicators to
global SD risks, we can present a ﬁrst, rough approx-
imation of how alternative clusters of 2 °C pathways
perform with respect to energy-related SDGs and
other multilaterally agreed sustainable energy objec-
tives (see table 2 and SI section 3 for a discussion on the
indicator choice).
Due to the limiteddata availability, the analysis can-
not address all relevant SDGs explicitly. But it enables
us to provide an early contribution to public and scien-
tiﬁc debates on the relationship between the interna-
tional climate policy and SDG agendas and contribute
to important early learning processes. To simplify the
complex relationship between indicators, energy-rela-
ted SDGs and other sustainable energy objectives (see
ﬁgure S2), table 2 focuses on the strongest links
between them. However, many indicators are also rele-
vant for some cross-cutting SDGs, such as poverty and
inequality, which are not addressed in the analysis (see
SI section 3.1). The resulting set of indicators is relevant
for judging both co-beneﬁts of mitigation (air quality,
oil security) and mitigation risks (upscaling of
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bioenergy and low-carbon electricity technologies) and
has been shown to have substantial sustainability impli-
cations in many integrated models (Jewell et al 2013,
McCollum et al 2013a, von Stechow et al 2015). It also
includes an indicator for ocean acidiﬁcation (Joos
et al 2011, Zickfeld et al 2012) as well as three indicators
that relate to transitional socioeconomic mitigation
risks (growth in mitigation costs and energy prices as
well as early retirement of coal capacity).
Our analysis presents SD risk proﬁles for alter-
native clusters of 2 °C pathways (see ﬁgures 2–4). The
ﬁgures plot percentage changes over baseline projec-
tions in each dimension rather than comparing differ-
ent metrics to each other and/or identifying critical
thresholds because of the difﬁculty of incommensur-
ability across different SD dimensions (von Stechow
et al 2015). Care needs to be taken in the interpreta-
tion, because the different risks analyzed cannot be
Table 1. Integratedmodel literature onmitigation challenges with implications for non-climate sustainability objectives, with a focus on
indicators that can be calculated frommodel variables. The different categories largely follow table 4.1 in Fleurbaey et al (2014). Due to
strengths andweaknesses of themodels, somemitigation challenges were only analyzed by individualmodels while others were covered by
multiplemodels—mostly in the context ofmodel inter-comparison projects. A comprehensive review on co-beneﬁts and risks ofmitigation
is provided in von Stechow et al (2015).
Mitigation challenges Indicators used Selected literature
Economic/affordability challenges
Aggregate economic costs of
mitigation
Aggregated and discountedGDP/
consumption losses
Kriegler et al 2013, Paltsev andCapros 2013, Clarke
et al 2014, Kriegler et al 2014, Rogelj et al 2015
Transitional economic costs of
mitigation
Consumption growth reduction Kriegler et al 2013, Luderer et al 2013a, 2013b, Bertram
et al 2015b
Carbon price growth Carbon price jump over a decade Rogelj et al 2013a, 2015
Global energy price index Luderer et al 2013b, Bertram et al 2015b
Energy price growth Electricity price growth rate Kriegler et al 2013, Rogelj et al 2015
Stranded fossil investment Idle power plant capacity per year Luderer et al 2013a, Rogelj et al 2013a, Bertram et al 2015a,
Johnson et al 2015
Energy dependence Tradeﬂows between regions Cherp et al 2013, Jewell et al 2013, 2014, Riahi et al 2012
Resilience of energy systems Diversity of energy carriers in indivi-
dual sectors (SWDI,HHI)
Cherp et al 2013, Jewell et al 2013, 2014
Depletion of oil reserves Cumulative oil extraction Sathaye et al 2011, Jewell et al 2013
Technological/innovation challenges
Integration challenges of low-
carbon technologies
Technological upscaling (rates) Wilson et al 2013, Kim et al 2014, Eom et al 2015, Riahi
et al 2015, van Sluisveld et al 2015, Bertram et al 2015a
Carbon intensity improvement Carbon intensity reduction rates Luderer et al 2013a, Edenhofer et al 2014a, Kriegler
et al 2014, Riahi et al 2015
Social/institutional challenges
Food price increase World and regionalmarket prices von Braun et al 2008, PBL 2012, Lotze-Campen et al 2014,
Wise et al 2014, vanVuuren et al 2015
Energy supply per capita/
energy access
Final energy supply per year/access to
modern fuels
van Ruijven et al 2012,Daioglou et al 2012, Krey et al 2012,
Steckel et al 2013, Riahi et al 2012, Pachauri et al 2013,
Lamb andRao 2015, vanVuuren et al 2015
Nuclear proliferation Enrichment/reprocessing facilities Lehtveer andHedenus 2015
Carbonmarket value Value of cumulative emissions Luderer et al 2013b, Bertram et al 2015b
Environmental challenges
Resource extraction/use Cumulative coal/uranium extraction Rogner et al 2012, Bauer et al 2013,McCollum et al 2014
Bioenergy expansion Biomass supply for energy Creutzig et al 2012, Smith et al 2014
Air pollutant concentration SO2, BC,OC andNOx emissions/
concentrations
Riahi et al 2012,McCollum et al 2013a, Rogelj et al 2014,
Rose et al 2014, Streﬂer et al 2014, vanVuuren et al 2015
Environmental risks of CO2
capture and storage
CO2 (fossil/biomass) captured and
stored underground
Kriegler et al 2013, Eom et al 2015, Rogelj et al 2015, Smith
et al 2016
Land use change Global area changes for cropland,
pasture, biomass, unmanaged land
Wise et al 2009, Reilly et al 2012, Lotze-Campen et al 2014,
Popp et al 2014, Calvin et al 2014
Water shortage Water use (mainly for bioenergy
supply)
De Fraiture et al 2008, Arnell et al 2011, PBL 2012,Hejazi
et al 2013, Bonsch et al 2016
Biodiversity loss Mean species abundance (MSA) PBL 2012, vanVuuren et al 2015
Peak atmospheric CO2
concentration
Cumulative CO2 emissions until
mid-century
Joos et al 2011, Zickfeld et al 2012
Exceedance likelihood/
overshoot risk
Likelihood of exceeding speciﬁc
temperature/concentration target
Kriegler et al 2013, Luderer et al 2013b, Rogelj
et al 2013a, 2013b
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directly compared to each other, i.e. a larger increase
in one risk is not necessarily more important than a
smaller increase in another risk. Any interpretation of
these risk proﬁles and any trade-off across risk dimen-
sions requires evaluation and weighting—and this
depends on the locally speciﬁc policy contexts and dif-
fer depending on individual priorities and risk percep-
tions (Slovic 1987, Jakob and Edenhofer 2014,
Kunreuther et al 2014). The provided risk proﬁles
therefore allow readers to make their own judgement
about the relevance of changes in risk levels across SD
dimensions. In this sense our analysis provides a start-
ing point for a more informed public debate about the
interaction between the mitigation and other energy-
related SDGs that will put the normative aspects of
such evaluation centre stage (see Edenhofer et al
2014b).
2.2. Choice of scenario data
Using model inter-comparison results from AMPERE
allows us to take advantage of an internally consistent
set of scenario speciﬁcations and harmonized input
assumptions (Kriegler et al 2015, Riahi et al 2015).
AMPERE work package 2 was chosen because (i) the
data is publicly available, (ii) it consistently deﬁnes
alternative short-term climate policy pathways across
models until 2030, which is particularly relevant from
an SDG perspective with a focus on short/medium-
term developments, and (iii) it is the only model inter-
comparison project that combines different types of
constraints with respect to the stringency of short-
term climate policies and the availability of mitigation
technologies or energy demand growth assumptions
(see table 3 and SI section S4). This is a key
requirement for comprehensively exploring the SD
risk dimensions of alternative 2 °C pathways. Yet the
reported data does not shed light on all relevant
dimensions. One shortcoming is the simplifying
assumption of regionally homogeneous carbon prices
without consideration of burden sharing regimes. This
impedes an analysis of regional mitigation cost dis-
tributions (see den Elzen et al 2008, Luderer et al 2012,
Tavoni et al 2013, Aboumahboub et al 2014, Tavoni
et al 2015) and related SD implications.
The analysis draws on more than 20 scenario spe-
ciﬁcations from seven models: DNE21+, GCAM,
IMAGE, MESSAGE, POLES, REMIND, and WITCH
(for further information, see Riahi et al (2015) and SI
section 4). To avoid comparisons of scenario results
from different sets of models, most ﬁgures only draw
on a subset of models as (i) not all models ran or found
a solution for all mitigation scenario speciﬁcations,
and (ii) not all models report results for all indicators
due to model type, assumptions on parameters and
constraints, or respective system boundaries (see table
S1). The results are presented similarly to the scenario
ranges in the Working Group III contribution to the
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (WGIII AR5) because
this shows variability across models. However, given
that the sample size is small and no systematic varia-
tion of all relevant model input assumptions was per-
formed this variability does not represent full model
uncertainty.
3. Results
The analysis is divided into two parts: we assess co-
beneﬁts of alternative 2 °C pathways before turning to
their mitigation risk proﬁles. In each part, we system-
atically analyze different clusters of 2 °C pathways to
understand the implications for SD outcomes of
variations in (i) short-term climate policy stringency,
(ii) availability of mitigation technologies or (iii) a
combination of the two. Analyzing these clusters is
highly relevant, because the current and projected
INDC emission trajectories are not consistent with
Table 2.The link between relevant and available indicators calculated from integratedmodel variables, SD risk dimensions, and SDGs and
other sustainable energy objectives. See ﬁgure S2 and SI section 3 formore details.
Indicators calculated from integratedmodel variables
SD risk dimensions affected by
mitigation
SDGs and other sustainable energy
objectives
Biomass supply for energy per year Bioenergy expansion Food security (SDG2)
Cumulative BC and SO2 emissions Air pollutant concentration Health via air quality (SDG3.9)
Maximumdecadal energy price growth Energy price growth Energy access (SDG7)
Maximumdecadal growth reduction Consumption growth reduction Economic growth (SDG8.1)
Idle coal capacity per year Stranded fossil investment Full employment (SDG8.3)
Maximumdecadal PV andWind upscaling Wind&PV grid integration Resilient infrastructure (SDG9)
Cumulative global oil trade, cumulative oil extraction,
fuel diversity of transport sector
Oil insecurity, transport sector
reliance on oil
Ensure energy securitya
Nuclear capacity expansion inNewcomersb Nuclear proliferation Peaceful use of nuclear power
Cumulative CO2 emissions untilmid-century Peak atmospheric CO2 concentration Minimize ocean acidiﬁcation
(SDG14.3)
CO2 captured and stored per year Environmental risks of CCS Sustainable production (SDG12.4)
a Due to the focus on global risks, the analysis is limited to oil security—the fuel with the highest scarcity concerns and high import
dependence inmost countries, lacking substitutes in transport (see SI section 3.1.7).
b We designed a new indicator that can draw on existingmodel variables (see SI section 3.2).
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optimal 2 °C pathways (UNFCCC 2015b) and the
standard assumption of full technological ﬂexibility is
inhibited as signiﬁcant upscaling of low-carbon tech-
nologies facesmany different hurdles in practice8. Our
analysis here focuses on the ﬁrst half of the 21st
century in which the interaction of short-term climate
policies and the long-term climate target is strongest
(Kriegler et al 2013, Luderer et al 2013a, 2013b, Riahi
et al 2015, Eom et al 2015, Bertram et al 2015a).
3.1. Synergies acrossmitigation and sustainable
energy objectives
Figure 1 uses cumulative indicators for (i) CO2
emissions (Zickfeld et al 2012), (ii) the co-emitted air
pollutants black carbon (BC) and sulphur dioxide
(SO2) and (iii) global oil extraction and trade as well as
transport sector reliance on oil to present reduced SD
risks, i.e. co-beneﬁts ofmitigation scenarios compared
to baseline developments. Figure 1 shows that co-
beneﬁts in terms of lower ocean acidiﬁcation, health
and oil security increase relative to optimal 2 °C
pathways by limiting the availability of key mitigation
technologies, though considerable differences exist for
different technologies and different sustainable energy
objectives. This is for threemain reasons:
(i) The unavailability of low-carbon technologies
limits long-term mitigation potential, resulting
in greater near-term emissions reduction
requirements to meet a particular long-term
climate goal. This leads to a decrease in fossil fuel
use in the medium term (with lower cumulative
global oil trade, oil extraction as well as transport
sector reliance on oil) and the associated CO2
emissions and co-emitted air pollutants. Limiting
technologies that play a smaller role in reaching
the long-term goal results in less dramatic trans-
ition requirements and fewer additional co-
beneﬁts.
(ii) When relying less on bioenergy and/or CO2
capture and storage (CCS) technologies, the
models are forced to switch more rapidly from
fossil fuels to solar, wind and nuclear energy,
which have higher co-beneﬁts for air quality and
oil security (Bruckner et al 2014, Hertwich
et al 2015).
(iii) Limiting the deployment of bioenergy or CCS
technologies that are associated with co-emitted
air pollutants themselves (see SI section 3.1.9)
additionally reduces air pollutant emission levels
—which is not the case for limiting the avail-
ability of non-combustible RE or new nuclear
capacity.
Admittedly, these results only cover a small subset
of potential co-beneﬁts frommitigation. However, the
literature suggests that this ﬁnding may apply more
broadly (see von Stechow et al 2015 for a review and
synthesis): climate policy that leads to less fossil fuel
use and energy demand growth in the near term drives
a broad range of co-beneﬁts beyond air quality and oil
security, such as reduced water use and pollution,
reduced ecosystem impacts, reduced health impacts
(also due to more physical activity under changed
mobility patterns and less fuel poverty in insulated
housing) as well as more local employment
opportunities.
Table 3.Naming of AMPEREmitigation scenarios (see table S3 andRiahi et al 2015 for details).
Model constraints Description Scenario name
Short-term targets (2030)
Optimal policy Emissions follow optimal 2 °Cpathway ‘OPT’
Low short-term target High-ambition pathway (low short-term target): 53GtCO2eq ‘LST’
High short-term target Low-ambition pathway (high short-term target): 61GtCO2eq ‘HST’
Technology cases
Full portfolio of technologies Full portfolio ofmitigation technologies ‘Full-Tech’
Low energy intensitya Energy intensity improvements rate doubles ‘LowEI’
Limited biomass Limited global potential for bioenergy (<100 EJ/yr) ‘LimBio’
NoCCS available CO2 capture and storage never becomes available ‘NoCCS’
Limited solar/wind potential Limited potential (<20%of regional electricity supply) ‘LimSW’
Nonewnuclear plants No newnuclear capacity is added; older plants are retired ‘NucOff’
a LowEI scenarios assume lower ﬁnal energy demand due to improvements in energy efﬁciency and behavioral changes so that equivalent
levels of overall energy service are supplied with lower ﬁnal energy. Due to the limited representation of end-use technologies in some
models,manymodels represent this in a stylizedway.
8
For example, CCS technology demonstration lags behind early
IEA technology roadmaps (IEA 2009); nuclear power plant invest-
ments face high public acceptance challenges and even renewable
energy (RE) investments are often opposed (Bruckner et al 2014).
Unforeseen events or accidents (e.g., Fukushima) change risk
perceptions of technologies (Rogers 1997, Patt and Weber 2014)
making the analysis of limited mitigation technology portfolios
interesting and relevant. To avoid unavailability of speciﬁc technol-
ogies, complementary technology policies (Somanathan et al 2014)
could reduce additional costs (Kalkuhl et al 2013, Bertram
et al 2015b) and ensure innovation activity, such as for CCS (von
Stechow et al 2011) or PV (Peters et al 2012).
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Comparing optimal 2 °C pathways with scenarios
assuming weak short-term climate policies conﬁrms
the positive effect of stringent mitigation in the near
term on themagnitude of co-beneﬁts (see ﬁgure S5 for
the year 2030): weak short-term climate policies imply
a reduction in co-beneﬁts relative to those that could
materialize in optimal 2 °C pathways. This effect is,
however, not as obvious for cumulative 2050 values
(see ﬁgure 1) because some of the additional mitiga-
tion efforts in the period 2030–2050 partially compen-
sate for weak climate policies until 2030. Since the
transport sector is characterized by faster capital turn-
over rates (at least with regard to the vehicle ﬂeet) (Ber-
tram et al 2015a), it can react more quickly to carbon
price changes, compensating for higher emissions
from sectors that are less ﬂexible. This may lead, for
example, to a higher fuel diversity in the transport sec-
tor in the year 2050 in delayed mitigation scenarios
compared to optimal 2 °C pathways albeit at high
uncertainty.
3.2. Trade-offs betweenmitigation and sustainable
energy objectives
While constraining a particular mitigation technology
may minimize the mitigation risks speciﬁc to that
technology, it usually implies an increase in the
deployment of other low-carbon technologies, which
may incur other mitigation risks. Figure 2 shows that
limiting the availability of speciﬁc technologies in 2 °C
pathways with immediate global climate policies
substantially increases the risk of not meeting other
sustainable energy objectives. While the unavailability
of CCS and limitation of bioenergy potential lead to
the largest co-beneﬁts (see ﬁgure 1), they also entail
signiﬁcantly higher SD risks. This can be explained by
the promise of greaterﬂexibility in near-term emission
pathways that are still able to meet the long-term
climate goal through the presence of carbon dioxide
removal technologies, such as bioenergy with CCS
(BECCS). Constraining BECCS deployment by limit-
ing the global bioenergy potential or ruling out CCS
deployment results in substantially higher deployment
of other mitigation technologies in the medium term.
The increase is much less pronounced for limiting the
potential for solar and wind energy or assuming no
newnuclear capacity (see ﬁgure S6).
Due to the different nature of the mitigation risks,
it is unclear how decreasing risks in one dimension
(e.g. bioenergy expansion or environmental risks asso-
ciated with CCS deployment), can be traded off with
risk increases in others (e.g. transitional growth reduc-
tion, energy price growth, nuclear proliferation or the
technological challenges of integrating high amounts
of ﬂuctuating RE into existing power grids in a very
Figure 1.Percentage changes in indicators for co-beneﬁts for reduced ocean acidiﬁcation, air quality, oil security, and transport sector
fuel diversity in alternative 2 °Cpathways for four integratedmodels (GCAM,MESSAGE, POLES, REMIND) relative to baseline
scenarios, comparing immediatemitigation scenarios assuming full availability ofmitigation technologies (grey)with delayed
mitigation scenarios (pink) and immediatemitigation scenarios assuming no newnuclear capacity (red), limited potential for solar
andwind energy (yellow) limited global bioenergy potential (green) or unavailability of CCS (purple). The thick black lines show the
median of results, the coloured ranges show the interquartile ranges andwhiskers show theminimumandmaximumresults.
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short time frame). For example, a 20%–30% increase
in energy prices may have a much more immediate,
adverse effect on the poor in many countries than a
4-7-fold increase in maximum decadal upscaling of
variable renewable energy sources, which is primarily
a technological and institutional challenge for infra-
structure provision. Rather than aggregating effects
across different risk dimensions, the purpose of this
analysis is to make the trade-offs across alternative
clusters of mitigation pathways transparent. Hence,
the way the climate SDG is met can substantially alter
the risks of not meeting other SDGs and sustainable
energy objectives.
This is conﬁrmed by ﬁgure 3: delaying stringent
mitigation in the near term leads to a signiﬁcant
increase in mitigation risk levels in the medium term
compared to optimal 2 °C pathways. With more GHG
emissions before 2030, subsequent reductions are
more expensive (Luderer et al 2013b) and need to be
faster to stay below 2 °C (Eom et al 2015)—with impli-
cations for the grid integration of ﬂuctuating RE (see
SI section 3.1.6) and for stranded investments in coal
capacity (Johnson et al 2015) and the associated job
losses (Rozenberg et al 2014). The carbon lock-in
effect hence manifests itself particularly in
technological and economic risk dimensions. To a les-
ser degree, these effects can also be seen for delayed
mitigation scenarios with more optimistic assump-
tions about short-term climate policies (see ﬁgure S7).
Hence, delaying stringent mitigation implies forgoing
potential paths with lower risks along multiple SD
dimensions.
In contrast, assuming lower energy demand
growth entails mitigation risk reductions relative to
optimal 2 °C pathways (see ﬁgure 3). As each unit of
energy not produced is free of pervasive supply-side
risks, reducing energy demand by promoting energy
efﬁciency in end-use sectors (e.g., consumer appli-
ances), lifestyle changes (e.g., people living in higher-
density areas and eating less dairy andmeat) and struc-
tural changes in the economy (e.g., shifting to more
service-oriented economies) is an important strategy
both for mitigation and other sustainable energy
objectives (von Stechow et al 2015).
Note that these reductions in energy demand
growth are assumed to happen in the baseline scenar-
ios, i.e. independent of the mitigation efforts and
hence without a cost mark-up; it is unclear how future
energy demand levels would develop under real-world
conditions where clean energy and energy efﬁciency
Figure 2.Percentage changes inmitigation risk dimensions in alternative 2 °Cpathways for three integratedmodels (GCAM,
MESSAGE, REMIND) relative to baseline scenarios and aCCS reference value, comparing immediatemitigation scenarios assuming
full availability ofmitigation technologies (grey), with scenarios assuming limited global bioenergy potential (green) and unavailability
of CCS (purple). Thick coloured lines showmedian results; coloured ranges show interquartile ranges. Neither the distance to the 0%-
line nor the total area covered by the shaded areas are good guidance for the overallmitigation risk of particular scenarios. Instead, the
evaluation differs for locally speciﬁc contexts with varying priority settings and risk perceptions (see discussion in section 2.2).
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projects may compete for limited funds (McCollum
et al 2013b). Furthermore, the models do not simply
prescribe lower energy supply at the expense of energy
service supply, but alter assumptions on the average
energy intensity improvement rates and, e.g., on the
viability of more compact, public transit-friendly
urban areas (Riahi et al 2015). This does not imply,
however, that all integrated models project ﬁnal
energy supplies in mitigation scenarios that are con-
sistent with minimum thresholds of energy consump-
tion to satiate basic needs related to cooking, heating,
health and other infrastructure (Steckel et al 2013,
Lamb and Rao 2015). Hence, projections of energy
demand from individual models need to be inter-
pretedwith care (see discussion in SI section 2).
3.3. Trade-offs betweenmitigation and sustainable
energy objectives for combinedmodel constraints
As current GHG emission trends keep tracking along
business-as-usual (Edenhofer et al 2014a) and societal
concerns grow with regard to upscaling of many low-
carbon technologies (see footnote 8), 2 °C pathways
with multiple constraints seem to mirror most
closely developments observed in the real world. In
fact, delaying stringent mitigation in combination
with technological constraints risks no longer meeting
the climate goal (Riahi et al 2015), substantially
increases mitigation risks (see ﬁgure 4) and increas-
ingly jeopardizes our ability to manage risk trade-offs.
For CCS and bioenergy whose unavailability/limita-
tions already show substantial risk trade-offs in
immediate mitigation scenarios, most models can no
longer ﬁnd a solution (for CCS unavailability only
DNE21+ and GCAM; for limited global bioenergy
potential only GCAM, POLES, and REMIND) imply-
ing a high risk of notmeeting the 2 °C target.
Figure 4 draws on AMPERE scenarios with multi-
ple constraints but shows results for more optimistic
—albeit not optimal — short-term climate policies9,
with and without limited global bioenergy potential.
As models work close to their feasibility frontier, the
additional constraint results in large mitigation risk
increases. Even for non-biomass RE and nuclear
energy, whose limitation/phase-out has rather small
effects in immediate 2 °C pathways, risk trade-offs
Figure 3.Percentage changes inmitigation risk dimensions in alternative 2 °Cpathways for six integratedmodels (DNE21+, GCAM,
MESSAGE, POLES, REMIND,WITCH) relative to baseline scenarios and aCCS reference value, comparing immediate (grey)with
delayedmitigation scenarios (pink) and immediatemitigation scenarios with lower energy demand growth (blue). Neither the
distance to the 0%-line nor the total area covered by the shaded areas are good guidance for the overallmitigation risk of particular
scenarios. Instead, the evaluation differs for locally speciﬁc contexts with varying priority settings and risk perceptions (see discussion
in section 2.2).
9
Figure 4 shows ‘LST’ scenarios (i.e. with more optimistic
assumptions about near-term climate policies relative to ‘HST’
scenarios but still less stringent than optimal, see table 1) because
only threemodels (GCAM, POLES, and REMIND)were able to ﬁnd
a solution for the ‘HST-LimBio’ scenarios.
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increase strongly for delayed mitigation scenarios in
some dimensions (see ﬁgures S7 and S8).
4.Discussion
This letter presents a ﬁrst attempt to shed light on the
question of how alternative 2 °C pathways perform in
non-climate SD dimensions and to draw conclusions
about important interactions between stringent miti-
gation andother sustainable energyobjectives. Figure 5
shows an overview of the different clusters of con-
strained 2 °C pathways relative to (each model’s)
optimal pathways (i.e., those with immediate mitiga-
tion, full technology portfolios, and conventional
energy demand growth). We use ‘optimal’ scenarios as
benchmarks because they show comparatively
balanced risk proﬁles relative to baseline develop-
ments (see ﬁgures 2–4) and because they are com-
monly used as reference point for policy analysis, e.g.
in theWGIIIAR5 (Edenhofer et al 2014a). This enables
the comparison of the various SD implications of one
cluster of 2 °C pathways to those of all others and
therefore facilitates an informed public debate on
socially acceptable SD risks and thus the interaction
between the international climate policy and the
broader SDG agendas.
Note that ‘optimal’ pathways are not necessarily
the most socially desirable because they may already
involve unacceptable risks. Scientiﬁc analysis alone
cannot judge whether a particular 2 °C pathway poses
acceptable or unacceptable risks to society (Edenhofer
and Minx 2014). Science can, however, explore alter-
native mitigation pathways and inform an enlightened
public debate across SD risk dimensions in an iterative
learning process (Edenhofer and Kowarsch 2015). For
example, annual bioenergy supply is projected to
reach up to 168 EJ (median: 158 EJ) in 2050 in optimal
scenarios. These levels of biomass extraction may
already be associated with fundamental challenges
with respect to food security, place-speciﬁc liveli-
hoods, water availability and biodiversity (Creutzig
et al 2012, Smith et al 2014). These numbers further
increase substantially over the second half of the cen-
tury, reaching up to 862 EJ (median: 268 EJ) with
growing requirements for removing CO2 from the
atmosphere via bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) technol-
ogies in many available scenarios (Clarke et al 2014).
Many ‘optimal’ 2 °C pathways have therefore been
Figure 4.Percentage changes inmitigation risk dimensions in alternative 2 °Cpathways for four integratedmodels (GCAM,
MESSAGE, POLES, REMIND) relative to baseline scenarios and aCCS reference value, comparing delayedmitigation scenarios
assuming full availability ofmitigation technologies andweak short-term climate policies (purple)with delayedmitigation scenarios
assuming limited global availability of bioenergy (green). Neither the distance to the 0%-line nor the total area covered by the shaded
areas are good guidance for the overallmitigation risk of particular scenarios. Instead, the evaluation differs for locally speciﬁc contexts
with varying priority settings and risk perceptions (see discussion in section 2.2).
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challenged on these grounds (Fuss et al 2014, Smith
et al 2016).
In a world which is increasingly unlikely to
develop along ‘optimal’ scenario trajectories, an
informed public debate about synergies and risk trade-
offs implied by alternative clusters of constrained 2 °C
pathways is key for identifying those which are socially
acceptable. For example, current INDCs at best add up
to emission trajectories similar to those 2 °C pathways
with low short-term ambition (‘LST’ scenarios, see
table 3)10. According to ﬁgure 5, these pathways (pre-
sented as circles) not only lead to fewer co-beneﬁts
compared to optimal 2 °Cpathways (except for cumu-
lative BC emissions and transport sector oil reliance)
but also to signiﬁcantly higher mitigation risk levels,
particularly in socioeconomic dimensions—with
higher risks of not meeting those SDGs related to eco-
nomic growth, energy access, job preservation, food
security and resilient grid infrastructure (see also
ﬁgure S7).
When a technology constraint is added, only the
risks speciﬁc to that technology can be lowered (e.g.
reduced nuclear proliferation risks for scenarios with
no new nuclear capacity or fewer grid integration chal-
lenges for scenarios with limited potential for solar
and wind energy, see also ﬁgures S8 and S9). The other
risk levels are exacerbated, particularly for those SDGs
Figure 5.Percentage changes in SD risk dimensions that can be linked to a set of SDGs and other sustainable energy objectives in
constrained 2 °Cpathways relative to optimal pathways (assuming immediatemitigationwith full availability ofmitigation
technologies and conventional energy demand growth). The different shapes denote different short-term climate policy stringencies
while the different colours denote different technology cases (see table 3). As theﬁgure aims at showing trends in synergies and risk
trade-offs of alternative clusters of 2 °Cpathways rather than an exact quantitative analysis, results are plotted in logarithmic scale (see
table S4 for the underlying data).
10
See http://infographics.pbl.nl/indc and http://climateaction
tracker.org/global.
10
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that relate to economic growth, job preservation, resi-
lient infrastructure, and ocean acidiﬁcation. This is
particularly obvious for scenarios with limited global
potential of bioenergy in which the risks related to
bioenergy expansion are lower (including environ-
mental effects related to BECCS deployment) but the
risks of not meeting socioeconomic SDGs are sig-
niﬁcantly higher (see green circles in ﬁgure 5). Limit-
ing the global use of bioenergy to 100 EJ per year by
2050—widely believed to be more sustainable (Creut-
zig et al 2014)—hence introduces a trade-off with
socioeconomic objectives for weak short-term climate
policies (see green circles inﬁgure 5).
While there are uncertainties around acceptable
levels of bioenergy deployment, the development and
deployment of CCS technology is lagging behind
expectations (IEA 2009), despite its important role in
keeping mitigation costs at relatively low levels (Eden-
hofer et al 2014a). Our results highlight two things:
ﬁrst, thosemodels that are ﬂexible enough to compen-
sate for the unavailability of CCS can only do so with
increased upscaling requirements for other low-car-
bon technologies and related SD risks (see pink circles
in ﬁgure 5). This also implies high near-term mitiga-
tion requirements with associated co-beneﬁts. Sec-
ond, the absence of CCS seriously questions the
achievability of the 2 °C target in a world with delayed
climate action and therefore threatens the climate
SDG itself—only twomodels can report results for the
combinationwithweak short-term climate policies.
In contrast, 2 °C pathways with lower energy
demand growth generally entail a substantial reduc-
tion in SD risk levels (blue shapes in ﬁgure 5). This
conﬁrms results from a bottom-up assessment of the
wider SD implications of technology-speciﬁc studies
from a cross-sectoral perspective (von Stechow
et al 2015). While these scenarios typically do not fea-
ture many additional co-beneﬁts due to lower supply-
side transition requirements, achieving lower energy
demand growth has considerable synergies with the
SDG agenda related to economic growth, food secur-
ity, resilient grid infrastructure as well as with the
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Delaying mitigation in
scenarios with low energy demand growth only entails
moderate risk increases—although some co-beneﬁts
are reduced and more coal capacity is likely to be
retired early. Pursuing aggressive energy efﬁciency
improvements across all sectors and rethinking high-
energy lifestyles therefore seems essential to increase
synergies and keep the trade-offs across SDGs man-
ageable in a world that is characterized by multiple
constraints. Unfortunately, model inter-comparison
projects have not yet analyzed the combination of
technology constraints and low energy demand
growth pathways, which is a promising research area
to better understand synergies between SDGs. Future
research should also ensure that mitigation scenarios
are consistent with minimum thresholds of energy
demand necessary to satiate basic human needs (see
discussion in SI section 2).
This letter has analyzed the changes in SD risks
across alternative 2 °C pathways. These effects depend
to a great extent on the development context, i.e.,
assumptions about baseline developments (Moss
et al 2010, O’Neill et al 2014). To circumvent this
potential caveat, the analysis used AMPERE data that
stands out in its comprehensive effort to harmonize
future socio-economic drivers of SD across models in
the baseline scenarios: e.g., regional-level gross
domestic product (GDP), population, and energy
demand growth. Thismakes the results more compar-
able across models but begs the question of how the
results would have changed for alternative assump-
tions beyond changes in energy demand growth.
Research can and should build on alternative baseline
developments as expressed by the ‘shared socio-
economic pathways’ (O’Neill et al 2014) that will soon
be published even though important, non-trivial dis-
cussions remain on how SDGs can be adequately built
into these baselines (O’Neill et al 2015).
Indicators that were used to track the changes in
SD risks are only rough and sometimes very rough
approximations of individual SDGs. There is no doubt
that individual models—particularly those coupled to
a detailed agro-economic and land-use model—could
already provide better indicators, such as for water
availability and ecosystem impacts which are impor-
tant concerns in stringent mitigation pathways (see SI
section 3.1.1). However, these have not yet been ana-
lyzed in a multi-model study (von Stechow et al 2015).
We believe that such inter-model comparison results
are crucial for a meaningful public debate about SD
risks.
Another important caveat of the analysis is that we
focus on 2050 and the preceding decades when look-
ing at the implications of alternative 2 °C pathways for
SD risk dimensions. The risks of some 2 °C pathways,
however, only unfold later in that century when some
particularly risky negative emissions technologies,
such as BECCS, are being deployed at large scale to
compensate for lower mitigation efforts in the ﬁrst
decades and residual GHG emissions in other sectors
(Fuss et al 2014, Smith et al 2016). For illustrative pur-
poses, ﬁgures S10 and S11 show how mitigation risks
change from 2050 to 2080 for scenarios with sub-
stantially different amounts of negative emission
requirements. Since the AMPERE scenario speciﬁca-
tions do not allow for ameaningful comparison across
scenarios with low or high amounts of negative emis-
sions, we use the amount of radiative forcing over-
shoot to cluster scenarios with respect to their
dependence on negative emissions (also used in the
WGIII AR5 scenario database, see Krey et al 2014). It
shows that the magnitude of the mitigation risk levels
can change substantially over time for those dimen-
sions that are related to negative emission technologies
such asCCS and bioenergy deployment.
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Our analysis points to important future chal-
lenges: ﬁrst, the chosen indicators do not represent all
SDGs as some touch on socio-cultural and institu-
tional aspects which are challenging—if not impos-
sible—to represent in an economic model framework
(see SI section 2). Second, the changes in the indicators
across scenarios aremerely indicative for the change in
risks to meet the related SDGs and sustainable energy
objectives because there are many more relevant dri-
vers that cannot be analyzed based on the available sce-
nario data. Third, many relevant issues play out at
lower geographic and time scales which are difﬁcult to
represent adequately in global-scale integrated mod-
els. For example, food security is driven by many
socioeconomic drivers both on global and local scales
and bioenergy expansion represents but one of those
(Tscharntke et al 2012). And according to Creutzig
et al (2012), the models are not (yet) suitable for oper-
ationalizing important global SD dimensions of bioe-
nergy supply such as the socioeconomic convergence
across different countries. Nevertheless, we argue that
the indicators used in this letter are relevant for evalu-
ating additional pressure on the energy-economy-cli-
mate system from additional constraints as
represented in the models. As such, they supply
important information from internally consistent
model frameworks taking into account inter-sectoral
and inter-regional interactions (von Stechow
et al 2015 and SI section 1).
We provide this early contribution to a public
debate on the relationship between the international
climate policy and the SDG agendas based on existing
multi-model scenario data that was not speciﬁcally
developed for this particular purpose. This stimulus
seems important because results from model inter-
comparisons that are tailored towards the SDG-cli-
mate nexus will not be published for some years. Only
byworkingwith the available data canwe start discuss-
ing relevant (risk) trade-offs and synergies. Based on
our analysis, we argue that SD considerations are cen-
tral for determining socially acceptable climate poli-
cies and that the prospects of meeting other SDGs
need not dwindle and can even be enhanced for some
goals if appropriate climate policy choices are made.
Moreover, experiences and caveats of this analysis can
help guide future research efforts at a relevantmoment
in time when new model comparison exercises are
being designed. For example, to remain policy-rele-
vant, SDG-focused multi-model comparisons will
need to address inequality, poverty, and basic human
needs as major drivers of the policy process much
more adequately. This requires a serious discussion,
e.g., on how to deal with the coarse regional dis-
aggregation in the integrated modelling frameworks.
Equally, successful efforts to address SDG-relevant
issues in onemodel, e.g., for the analysis of water avail-
ability or ecosystem impacts (see SI section 2), will
need to be lifted into amulti-model context.
5. Conclusion
Until now, no multi-model study has been used to
systematically analyze the changes in SD risks implied
by stringent mitigation scenarios and evaluate them
across a set of SDGs. This letter addresses this research
gap by analyzing a comprehensive set of alternative
clusters of 2 °C pathways consistently formulated
across many integrated models from the AMPERE
model inter-comparison study, drawing on publicly
available scenario results to calculate indicators for
global SD risks. We shed light on the implications of
alternative clusters of 2 °C pathways for meeting a set
of energy-related SDGs and other sustainable energy
objectives and to inform the public debate about the
synergies and trade-offs across the international cli-
mate policy and the SDGagendas.
Our analysis shows that the near-term choice of
2 °Cpathways has implications for the extent of syner-
gies and trade-offs across energy-related SDGs in the
medium term. Given current trends in emissions and
technology deployment, we argue that mitigation
pathways are likely to be characterized by multiple
constraints. But adding limits on the availability of
speciﬁc mitigation technologies on top of weak short-
term climate policies decreases synergies and locks in
substantial trade-offs across environmental and socio-
economic objectives. From an SDG perspective, the
challenges of meeting other sustainable energy objec-
tives substantially change with the way the climate
SDG will be met. In some cases, meeting the 2 °C tar-
get is even threatened itself. Achieving low-energy
demand growth, e.g., through aggressive energy efﬁ-
ciency improvements, helps to manage these trade-
offs and attain multiple energy-related SDGs together.
We ﬁnd the greater the constraints on ﬂexibility in
meeting the 2 °C target, the higher the risks of not
meeting other SDGs and the ﬂexibility to manage
these risks. Governments at all levels need to be
informed about such implications of their collective
decision for the attainability of global SDGs. This
could avoid additional pressures on the sustainability
of each region’s development pathway.
After COP21, decision makers need to rethink
their commitment to the SDG agenda, given that the
short-term ambition for mitigation action falls short
of the mitigation efforts consistent with staying below
2 °C in a cost-effective way. According to our results,
this is likely to decrease co-beneﬁts and increase the
risks for attaining energy-related SDGs and other sus-
tainable energy objectives. Since many of these SD
risks are best dealt with at the global level, however,
theymight be good entry points into additional incen-
tives for international cooperation. We suggest that
the review of INDCs should provide for an assessment
of policies at all scales to monitor global risks for non-
climate sustainability objectives that arise from spe-
ciﬁc global mitigation pathways. Monitoring these
risks could avoid unintended consequences (which
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might even delegitimize the 2 °C target), ﬁnding new
entry points for global cooperation and providing
rationales for ramping up mitigation ambition in the
short tomedium term.
Future research should extend the current system
boundaries and, based on a comprehensive review of
model literature on the climate-SDG nexus, establish
indicators that help evaluate integrated policies
addressing multiple SDGs in a uniﬁed framework.
This would be a prerequisite for model inter-compar-
ison projects with a focus on the interactions across
multiple SDGs that could result in meaningful and
robust results for better decisionmaking. Climate pol-
icy will not be successful unless it seriously considers
other policy objectives and therefore wider SD impli-
cations. Dividing the huge effort of achieving more
sustainable development pathways into isolated policy
problems will fall short of reaping synergies and suc-
cessfullymanaging trade-offs across themany SDGs.
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